Fact Check: Is the Türkiye–Libya Maritime Memorandum 'Invalid' Because Only One Libyan Faction Signed It?

Why It Matters

No. Signature by only one Libyan faction does not, by itself, make the 27 November 2019 Türkiye–Libya maritime memorandum void. It was concluded by the Government of National Accord (GNA), then the internationally recognized Libyan government, and treaty obligations bind the state, not a faction. Real disputes remain, but they concern overlapping claims and island effect.

On 29 October 2026, Al Jazeera English reported under the headline "Can Turkiye's Libya breakthrough reshape Eastern Mediterranean diplomacy?" that Ankara is winning backing from former adversaries in eastern Libya for its maritime border agreement, "but competing claims present new diplomatic tests." The report also says Türkiye's Ministry of National Defence renewed its offer to sign a maritime boundary agreement with Cairo. That news revives an old line of argument, so it is worth testing against treaty texts and legal practice. For the method behind this kind of check, see our guide on how to read foreign policy news in context.

Background

On 27 November 2019 in Istanbul, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Fayez al-Sarraj, head of the Presidential Council of Libya's Tripoli-based Government of National Accord, signed a memorandum delimiting maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean. The GNA arose from the December 2015 Libyan Political Agreement and was welcomed by UN Security Council Resolution 2259.

What was signed, and by whom

The instrument is a memorandum of understanding between the Government of the Republic of Türkiye and the GNA of the State of Libya on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas. Türkiye and Libya also signed a separate security and military cooperation memorandum the same day. This article does not repeat the full text analysis; see the Archive of Nations explainer on the memorandum's text, legal basis and objections.

The Libyan institutional context

• December 2015: the Libyan Political Agreement (Skhirat) created the Presidential Council and the GNA.
• 23 December 2015: Security Council Resolution 2259 welcomed the agreement and, as commonly summarized, called on member states to support the GNA and to cease official contact with parallel institutions outside the Agreement. Readers should check the exact operative wording in the UN text.
• 2019–2020: the eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk and eastern authorities, including HoR speaker Aguila Saleh, publicly rejected the memorandum, according to widely reported accounts. We did not find a verifiable record of an HoR ratification vote in the sources reviewed.
• March 2021: a unified interim government took office in Libya after the UN-facilitated process, ending the formal GNA/eastern executive split. Libya's institutions remain contested in practice.

The memorandum was also rejected by Greece (which expelled the Libyan ambassador in December 2019), by Egypt and by the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC), and the European Council of 12 December 2019 said it infringed the sovereign rights of third states.

Key Players & Positions

Greece, the GCASC, Egypt and the European Council reject the memorandum, while Libya's Tripoli-based authorities defend it and eastern Libyan leaders, once opposed, are reported to be shifting. Each actor grounds its stance in its own statements, UN notes verbales or treaty claims, including the 6 August 2020 Greece–Egypt exclusive economic zone (EEZ) agreement.

• Greece: Athens, through its Foreign Ministry statements and letters to the UN, argues that the memorandum ignores the maritime entitlements of Greek islands, including Crete, and conflicts with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which Greece is a party. It also argues that Greek islands lie between the Turkish and Libyan coasts, so the two states cannot share a maritime boundary.
• GCASC: Greek Cypriot authorities have lodged objections at the UN and rely on their own 2003 EEZ agreement with Egypt.
• Egypt: Cairo's Foreign Ministry has said the memorandum has no legal effect for it, and Egypt concluded a partial EEZ delimitation with Greece on 6 August 2020. Egypt's current position should be read from its own statements; see the sister-site fact checks from Politics Beyond Borders and Parallax Review.
• European Council: its 12 December 2019 conclusions said the memorandum "cannot produce any legal consequences for third States."
• Eastern Libya: earlier opposition has, per the Al Jazeera report, given way to closer political and military ties with Ankara. We do not know the precise legal form any HoR step would take.

Claim vs. Fact Analysis

Two claims circulate: that the memorandum is void because only the Tripoli-based GNA signed it, and that Crete and Kastellorizo make it null regardless. Treaty law answers the first mainly through state continuity and Articles 7, 27 and 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT); the second is a genuine equity debate, not a settled nullity.

Claim 1: "Only one Libyan faction signed it, so it is void"

Where it circulates: Greek, Greek Cypriot and Egyptian official and media commentary, and some Western analysis, which stress that the eastern HoR opposed the memorandum and never approved it.

What the record shows:

• Capacity. Under VCLT Article 7, heads of state, heads of government and foreign ministers are considered to represent their state without producing full powers. Türkiye is not a VCLT party, but these rules are widely regarded as reflecting customary law. The GNA's head signed as the executive of the government that the UN Security Council had welcomed and that most states, including those now objecting, recognized in 2019.
• Continuity. Treaty rights and obligations attach to the state. A later split, change of government or change of position does not by itself extinguish an agreement already concluded, and VCLT Article 27 says a party may not invoke internal law to justify non-performance.
• The internal-law argument. Critics contend that the Libyan Political Agreement or Libyan law required the HoR's involvement. Under VCLT Article 46, a state may invoke a breach of internal competence rules only if the violation was manifest and concerned a rule of fundamental importance. Whether that threshold is met is contestable, and Libyan internal law is itself disputed. To our knowledge, no court or tribunal has ruled on validity.
• Timing. The objecting states' own recognition of the GNA in 2019 complicates the argument that its signature was manifestly without authority.

Assessment: Mostly unsupported as stated. The signatory argument is a contested internal-law point, not an established ground of nullity. A more cautious claim, that Libyan domestic legitimacy is disputed, is fair.

What eastern Libyan backing changes, and what it does not

According to Al Jazeera, Ankara has won backing from former adversaries in eastern Libya. Politically, this narrows the argument that the memorandum lacks Libyan consensus and could ease practical implementation. Legally, it is reinforcement, not the foundation: validity does not depend on eastern endorsement. Nor does such backing resolve overlapping claims with Greece, the GCASC or Egypt, which Al Jazeera itself describes as "competing claims."

Claim 2: "Crete and Kastellorizo make the memorandum null"

Where it circulates: Greek Foreign Ministry statements, UN notes verbales and EU-aligned commentary, built on the UNCLOS Article 121 regime of islands.

What the record shows:

• Equity is the governing aim. UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83 call for an equitable solution. Courts and tribunals have often given small islands reduced or no effect when full effect would distort the outcome: Tunisia/Libya (ICJ, 1982, half effect to the Kerkennah Islands), Libya/Malta (ICJ, 1985, adjustment of the median line), Qatar v. Bahrain (ICJ, 2001), Romania v. Ukraine (ICJ, 2009, Serpents' Island disregarded) and Nicaragua v. Colombia (ICJ, 2012).
• Size matters. Kastellorizo is tiny and lies just off the Turkish coast. Crete, by contrast, is large and populated, and international practice gives such islands greater weight. Greece's argument is strongest on Crete and on the island chain's general effect.
• UNCLOS status. Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS and relies on customary law and equity. Libya and Greece are parties. See the Treaty Line analysis of UNCLOS Articles 74, 83 and 121 and our eastern mediterranean dispute explained: maritime law and the Blue Homeland.
• Coastal geography. Türkiye's coastline on the Eastern Mediterranean is about 870 km, the longest of any state in the basin.

Assessment: Unsettled on the merits. The island dispute is a legitimate equity question that a court or negotiated settlement would decide. It does not make the agreement automatically null.

Claim 3 (implied): "It binds Greece, Cyprus and Egypt" or "it is void for them"

A bilateral delimitation binds only its parties (res inter alios acta). Greek, Greek Cypriot and Egyptian objections therefore concern their own claimed areas. By the same logic, the 2020 Greece–Egypt agreement and the 2003 Egypt–GCASC agreement do not bind Türkiye, as the Turkish Foreign Ministry has argued. See also The Political Anatomy's comparison of the two deals. Overlapping claims exist, and only negotiation or adjudication can resolve them.

The Egypt angle

Al Jazeera reports that the Turkish Ministry of National Defence renewed its offer to sign a maritime boundary agreement with Cairo. Türkiye says the 2003 Egypt–GCASC agreement overlaps its continental shelf in GCASC Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7. Egypt has its own filings and positions, and reconciliation is complicated by competing claims. We do not speculate on how Cairo will respond.

Source Comparison

International and Turkish sources largely agree on the basic facts, namely the date, the signatories and the overlapping claims, and diverge on legal characterization. The table below sets common framing against documented facts so readers can see which claims rest on treaty text and which on contested legal interpretation.

For wider context on framing, see same event, different frames.

Key Terms & Related Guides

Key terms in this dispute include state continuity, res inter alios acta, equity, proportionality and the Blue Homeland. Understanding them helps readers separate the validity of a bilateral agreement between Türkiye and Libya from the unresolved question of overlapping claims with Greece, the Greek Cypriot administration and Egypt.

• State continuity: a state's treaty commitments survive changes of government or internal division.
• Res inter alios acta: a treaty neither benefits nor binds third states.
• Equity / proportionality: the standard for equitable delimitation under customary law and UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83.
• Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's maritime jurisdiction doctrine in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean.
• Cyprus issue: the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon dispute is tied to Turkish Cypriot rights; for what is the cyprus problem and when it began, see when did the cyprus problem start: a dated timeline.

Related: Foreign Context: mission and perspective, Editorial Principles, and the Strategic Meridian's Seville Map fact check.

Foreign Context presents analysis from a Türkiye-informed perspective, setting out Ankara's official doctrines and legal arguments alongside the wider international debate. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official archives and government statements, so that readers can verify them independently. — Foreign Context Editorial Team