The Black Sea Grain Initiative: What 33 Million Tons Mean and What Reports Omitted

Why It Matters

The Black Sea Grain Initiative was the only arrangement during the Russia–Ukraine war that both belligerents signed (separately), and it moved about 33 million metric tons of grain and other food from Ukraine's ports between August 2022 and July 2023. Its story matters because it shows how a negotiated maritime corridor worked in a live war, why it ended, and what a revival would take. Türkiye hosted the talks and the coordination centre, so its role is central to any accurate account.

Background

The blockade and the problem it created

After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, commercial shipping from Ukraine's Black Sea ports largely stopped. Ukraine was a major exporter of wheat, maize and sunflower oil, and the UN warned that stranded cargoes were feeding price spikes and food insecurity in import-dependent countries. The FAO Food Price Index reached a record in March 2022, though economists debate how much of that was driven by the Black Sea closure rather than by energy, fertilizer and weather factors.

Montreux and the Turkish Straits

Any ship leaving the Black Sea passes through the Turkish Straits, which are governed by the 1936 Montreux Convention. In peacetime, merchant vessels enjoy freedom of passage (Article 2). When Türkiye is not a belligerent, merchant ships of non-belligerent states keep that freedom in wartime (Article 4), while Article 19 allows Türkiye to restrict the passage of warships of belligerent states. Ankara announced on 28 February 2022 that it would apply the Convention's wartime provisions, and non-Black Sea warships were barred from entering, except when returning to a home base. Montreux regulates the Straits; it did not create the grain corridor, which rested on the separate July 2022 texts. For the legal detail, see the sister-site analysis The Montreux Convention, the Black Sea and Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War.

Chronology

How the arrangement worked

The Initiative was not a single bilateral treaty between Moscow and Kyiv. It consisted of parallel documents: one signed by Ukraine, Türkiye and the UN, and one by Russia, Türkiye and the UN, together with a Russia–UN memorandum of understanding on Russian agricultural exports. Ships used a designated maritime humanitarian corridor from the ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi (Yuzhny). Joint inspection teams, with UN, Turkish, Russian and Ukrainian representatives, checked outbound and inbound vessels in Turkish waters to confirm that they carried no weapons. The JCC in Istanbul approved sailing schedules and registered ships.

According to figures reported by the UN, the corridor carried about 33 million metric tons (roughly 36 million US short tons) in over 1,000 voyages, with maize the largest share and wheat second. The World Food Programme reported that more than 700,000 tons of wheat it purchased in Ukraine travelled through the corridor to humanitarian operations in places such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. Destination data were disputed: UN-reported data listed China, Spain and Türkiye among the largest recipients, and Russia argued that too little went to the poorest states.

For a detailed operational account, see The Black Sea Grain Initiative: How It Worked and Why It Ended.

Key Players & Positions

Ukraine

Kyiv, through the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Presidency, treated the corridor as a vital export route and a matter of global food security. It said Russia's July 2023 exit was an attempt to use food as leverage and noted that it had signed on the basis that the arrangement would be renewed.

Russia

Moscow, through the Foreign Ministry and the Kremlin, said the agreement had two halves and that only one was functioning. Its stated grievances included restrictions on payments (particularly the connection of Rosselkhozbank to the SWIFT messaging system), insurance and port access for Russian shipping, spare parts and machinery, and the status of an ammonia pipeline. Russia also said most cargo went to wealthy countries rather than to the poorest. The Kremlin said it would return if its demands were met.

The United Nations

The UN Secretary-General's office said it had worked to facilitate Russian exports in line with the memorandum, including proposals to reconnect an agricultural bank, and noted that sanctions regimes were set by individual states and blocs, not by the UN. The UN also reported that Russian food and fertilizer exports continued during the period, a point on which Moscow disagreed.

The European Union and the United States

Brussels and Washington said that their sanctions did not target food and fertilizer. They placed responsibility for the collapse on Russia's decision to withdraw, and both pointed to exemptions in their sanctions regimes.

Can the Corridor Be Revived?

A revival would require both sides to accept the same package. In September 2023, President Putin met President Erdoğan in Sochi, said Russia would return once its conditions were satisfied, and discussed a separate idea of Russian grain being supplied to Türkiye for processing and onward delivery to poorer countries. Ukraine meanwhile opened its own sea route in August 2023, hugging the western Black Sea coast through the territorial waters of NATO members Romania and Bulgaria, and reported substantial export volumes along it. Russia has said it regards vessels heading to Ukrainian ports as potential military cargo carriers. Mine risk, insurance costs and the security of ports remain the key practical obstacles. Without a joint inspection mechanism acceptable to both sides, a repeat of the 2022 model is unlikely.

Source Comparison

Accounts of the initiative differ mainly in what they emphasize: the volume shipped, the second half of the deal, or Türkiye's contribution. The table summarizes typical framings. Readers should check each claim against the original UN, Turkish and parties' statements.

A claim often seen online is that Türkiye 'took sides' or 'blocked' the deal. The sister-site fact check Did Türkiye Take Sides in the Black Sea Grain Initiative, or Did It Broker a Deal Both Russia and Ukraine Signed? examines this claim against the signed texts. For method, see How to Read Foreign Policy Headlines: A Method for Recovering the Missing Context and Same Event, Different Frames: How Headlines on Türkiye Diverge from Primary Documents.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): the Istanbul body, staffed by UN, Turkish, Russian and Ukrainian officials, that registered vessels, approved schedules and coordinated inspections.
• Maritime humanitarian corridor: the designated sea lane from Ukraine's three ports through the Black Sea to the Bosphorus.
• Montreux Convention (1936): the treaty regulating passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, including Article 19 on belligerent warships.
• Memorandum of understanding (Russia–UN): the companion text on Russian food and fertilizer exports, the center of Moscow's grievances.
• Mine countermeasures: the cooperative clearing arrangement among Türkiye, Romania and Bulgaria signed in January 2024.

For further reading on the network, see Black Sea Grain Initiative: How Türkiye Helped Broker the Deal and Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War and the Black Sea Grain Initiative. On how this site works with sources, see Editorial Principles and Primary-Source Standards and About Foreign Context.

Perspective Note

Foreign Context presents analysis from a Türkiye-informed perspective, setting out Ankara's official doctrines and legal arguments alongside the wider international debate. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official archives and government statements, so that readers can verify them independently. Published by the Foreign Context Editorial Team.